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Commentary

Commentary I Edward L. Ayers
Without a second and unarmed, I have no inclination to offer a
fundamental challenge to Professor Bowman's argument or his
character. In fact, he has served us well by focusing on honor,
martialism, and dueling as indices of comparison between the
antebellum planters and the pre-1848 Junkers. I would like to
build on the wealth of detail he has provided to help clarify the
larger comparison between the South and Prussia, a comparison
that has consumed so much of our energies over the last decade.
We might begin by distinguishing more carefully among the
three related phenomena Professor Bowman discusses, for each
tells us something different about the two societies we are trying to
understand. Better than most things we could ~xamine, dueling
assumed recognizably similar forms in both the South and Prussia,
was considered a signal institution of both regions, elicited considerable contemporary comment, and evolved in ways that allow us
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to use it as a barometer of the planters' and Junkers' sense of
themselves. On the other hand, while martialism provided much
of the impetus and context for dueling in Prussia, the southern
attraction for martial values had only a brief opportunity to attach
itself to a powerful military establishment. As a result, southern
martialism necessarily remained more a cultural predisposition
than an entrenched way of life. Honor, the larger culture in which
both dueling and militarism were embedded, was more than the
sum of its parts; it remains, after many studies, an elusive, complex, and problematic concept.
Besides breaking the topic down into distinct components, I
would also like to set it in motion in a way that Professor Bowman
did not attempt. One of the most challenging things about comparative history is that our targets are more likely than not moving
at different speeds and maybe even in different directions. I would
like to use that challenge as an opportunity to examine change
rather than merely to freeze two societies in time in order to
compare some essence they may or may not have shared over
several decades.
Let me begin with a brief sketch of the evolution of the Junkers
that will take us somewhat beyond Professor Bowman's focus. The
landowners of Prussia experienced many hard times from the
fifteenth century on, as they were buffeted by the vicissitudes of
commercial agriculture, by an unstable political environment, by
devastating military defeats, by a restive peasantry. Fortunately for
tpe Junkers, though, in the eighteenth century they joined in a
tight alliance with the state, which they served as officials and as
officers. They survived as a class through all the vicissitudes of the
nineteenth century, in fact, largely because they were so deeply
attached to the state, an attachment that grew stronger in the face
of the challenges of the new century.
After the defeat of the Prussian-led army by Napoleon at Jena in
1806 and the attendant end of serfdom and beginning of free trade
in land and estates, the Junkers maintained their strategic position
in the military. As increasing numbers of civil positions went to
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better-educated commoners, the Junkers of Prussia channeled
their poorly educated sons into the military in astonishing proportions. Even as the Junkers' economic power dwindled in the early
decades of the nineteenth century, their sons found proud sanctuary in the army. As one observer wrote in 1846, "when he gets a
small beard, when the epaulettes for the first time flourish on his
shoulders, when the plume for the first time waves from his head,
when the soldiers in all comers present arms, how should he not
feel that he is predestined to represent a 'higher being' in this
world?"1
After 1848 the Prussian nobility saw further erosion of their
ancient power over the rural folk among whom they lived and held
on to their position in the army even more tenaciously. In the
turmoil, the Junkers championed the army as the only true guarantor of order and justice; because the revolution left much of the
old order intact the Prussians were able to dominate the powerful
army in the 1860s and 1870s as they had in the 1830s and 1840s.
Moreover, when the Junkers made an economic comeback in the
last third of the nineteenth century they cultivated their selfconsciously archaic ways, aided by the weight and privilege of
their noble titles. Even as young noblemen took middle-class
wives, they assimilated the commoners into the ethos of the
military, "feudalized" them (creating a topic of much discussion in
the society pages of American newspapers along the way, who
were outraged that so many of our best young women were opting
for marriages to dessicated European noblemen}. The military
schools of Prussia, meanwhile, dwelt on honor and military virtues
at the expenses of other teaching.
History, in other words, seemed to be running backward east of
the Elbe: industrialists were becoming ennobled and the ideals of
the Enlightenment eroded even as the Junkers were becoming
ever more deeply engaged in the international capitalist market.
Perhaps the greatest testimony to the growing gap between an
eroded personalism on the estates and a continued tradition of
personal honor came late in the century; in those years, nearly two
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million rural laborers left the Prussian provinces and the Junkers
turned to distinctly non-feudal, transitory, imported labor-yet
the landlords preserved their traditional place in the Prussian
bureaucracy and in the military. In 1900, 61 percent of its officers
were noblemen, and the higher the officer the more likely he was
to be of the oldest and most honorable families. In other words,
honor seemed to inhere far more in modern bureaucratic and
military structures than in archaic relationships between estate
owners and their workers.
The contrasts with the history of the southern planters are
striking. The well-known analogies between the postwar planters
and the Junkers have been drawn because of their reactionary
domination over an agricultural region during an era when the
larger society was undergoing rapid industrialization. This brief
sketch makes it clear that the Junkers had far greater success in
adapting the new social order to their ideals and purposes than the
postwar planters could even have hoped. After emancipation, the
planters saw no further concerted attack on their plantations, but
in every other facet oflife they saw a precipitous and steady erosion
of their power and influence. Once southern lawmakers granted
planters the power of the lien in the 1870s, the landlords asked for
little else from their state and national governments other than to
be left alone. They were. Despite a few sentimental and overtly
nostalgic novels and songs, the cultural power of the planters
evaporated in the New South; the tides of change were on the side
.of the town dwellers, with their attachment to the emerging mass
culture and mass economy of Gilded Age America. The sons and
daughters of the planters married into the families of merchants
and professionals and moved to town-not the other way around.
The tiny professional army of the United States, the army that
southerners still associated with their defeat, offered small refuge.
The churches saw a new differentiation by class as well as by race,
as common people created their own congregations, out of the
reach of the planters.
The evolution of the planters and the Junkers across the nine-
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teenth century shows, in other words, how intimately the planter
class's power and identity were tied to slavery, not merely the
plantation or even to race. The planters, unlike the Junkers,
enjoyed no important role in the national government or military,
no hereditary nobility, no ties of sentiment to a monarch. When
slavery was gone, the planters had no other institution in which
they could find refuge.
The history of dueling is the clearest example of this cultural
dimension of class domination and testifies to the deep differences
between the two landholding classes. Let me briefly trace the
evolution of dueling in their societies. It seems that the heyday of
the southern duel came in the 1830s and 1840s, here on the cotton
frontier. Yet the practice fell under steady and increasing attack,
and the 1850s may well have seen a decline in the practice. We see
relatively little evidence of dueling in the Confederacy, as the
elective officer corps undermined some of the rationale for dueling
and as Christian soldiers such as Lee and Jackson clearly stood
above the practice. The postwar years saw a steady diminution of
dueling, even though a few famous conflicts appeared among the
other kinds of violence that quickly became synonymous with the
New South. Within a generation after Appomattox, the southern
duel was a thing of the past.
Not so in Prussia. There, the duel flourished during the same
decades it flourished in the antebellum South-and then· continued to flourish, even as Germany experienced some of the most
rapid industrial growth in Europe. In fact, as Bowman points out,
dueling actually spread from the military and the university to
politics after the reforms of 1848, when an elected assembly was
established. As a recent account observes, "duelling continued to
be practiced on quite a substantial scale in Protestant Prussia, not
only among students but also among army officers, officers of the
reserve, civilian aristocrats and impeccably bourgeois professionals such as doctors, dentists and apothecaries well into the twentieth century. "2 The mention of students in this passage is significant, for the universities of the South had nothing like the dueling
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societies of Germany. As the century drew to a close, as ritualized
dueling and scarred cheeks proliferated in German universities
and as the universities overtook the army as the major disseminator of dueling in Prussia, southern universities rushed instead to adopt football, with its more diffuse and flamboyant (and in
the early years of the sport in what was to become the SEC,
deadly) use of the violent impulse and quest for collective honor.
Why the difference? Why the persistence of the duel in Prussia
and its atrophy in the South? It seems clear that, as the Prussian
Road analogy argues, both the planters and the Junkers were in
some ways anomalous classes, taking their identity from their local
privilege and power while remaining in tension with the larger
structures of their nation states. Early in their histories, both
relied on the whip and the gun to control their subalterns, even as
both spoke in a language of paternalism and noblesse oblige. Both
subsequently had to contend with upheavals oflabor and politics,
and both found their values challenged by the spokesmen ofliberal
democracy. Both had to trim their ambitions to fit national political
realities over which they had limited control.
The major difference is that the more extreme Prussians, with all
their heavy baggage of manners and power, were better able to
adapt to change than the planters, with their carry-on bag of
tradition (a bag that contained evangelical Protestantism and ideals
of representative government as well as traditions of domination).
The death of the duel in the South reveals how little integrity and
weight the planters had outside of slavery. While antebellum
politics had in many ways turned around slavery, the planters had
no special body in the national government-as did the Prussians-they could use to harness or soften the change that swept
over them. Southerners hardly dominated the United States Army
in the decades after their defeat, and even if they had the army was
of little cultural importance in America.
Such institutions were vital-and this is the key-for in both
the South and in Prussia honor was not some naive holdover from a
"traditional" culture. Instead, it was something that had to be self-
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consciously constructed and maintained. That it could be maintained even in the face of industrial capitalism is made clear by the
German experience; modernity was not some unitary substance,
some all-encompassing and internally consistent ethos that triumphed over everything in its path. But without the sense of
confidence and common identity fostered by some institution
more exclusive and ennobling than sharecropping or a motley
Democratic party, the planters could not muster the energy for
dueling, could not maintain a proud and bristling honor. And could
not dominate the New South culturally or ideologically.
Which brings us to a final twist. The Junkers managed to lend
the ancient values of honor a new, if temporary, lease on life,
leading the dentists and pharmacists of Prussia to the dueling
ground. That would seem to suggest that the Junkers were a
dominant reactionary class in modern Germany, a class that lent
much of its style and many of its values to the Germany of the
twentieth century. Indeed, the notion that Germany followed a
unique, and tragic, path to industrial capitalism, a path tortuously
winding through authoritarianism and archaic militarism, a path
that began in Prussia, has become an article of faith-and the
foundation of a whole genre of southern history. The notion of that
Prussian Road was part of a critical wave of historiography emerging after World War II that sought to counteract the conservative
tradition of modern German history that dissociated· the Third
Reich from earlier eras of German history. As such, it served a
salutary and noble purpose. But in the 1980s a new and influential
revisionist school in German history has expressed skepticism
about applying an implicit model of"modernization" drawn from
American social science and an idealized version of British and
French history to every other country in the world. As a leader in
this revision puts it, "I have become more skeptical over the years
about the version of continuity in modern German history that
relentlessly catalogues the malign role played by pre-industrial
elites and institutions.... We hear too much about the Germany
of the spiked helmet and too little about top-hatted Germany, ...
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too much about the power of a pre-industrial elite and too little
about the effects of capitalism in structuring German society and
politics. "3 This revisionist school seeks a broader vision of Germany's path to Hitler, one that does not allow the easy solution of
blaming it on the Junkers, one that does not stop large parts of
history. We do not have to accept all its arguments and implications
(and I do not) to see that it throws the concept of the Prussian Road
into doubt even as it applied to Germany.
Just as revisionists want to stress the role of groups other than
Junkers in modern German history, so do I think our focus on the
power of the planters obscures how much else was going on in the
postwar South, how many other groups played their role in making
the New South what it was, good and bad. Our fixation on the
postwar planters obscures, most importantly for the discussion at
hand, the recognition that honor was not the planters' exclusive
preserve. Honor was not merely "ambivalent," as Bowman would
stress, it was multivalent, highly inflected. It had powerful meaning to groups other than those at the top of the social order. In fact,
as I have argued elsewhere, honor died from the top down in the
New South-where druggists and dentists never thought of dueling (the very idea sounds like one of Faulkner's satires). Honor
apparently stayed alive, though, among the black communities of
the urban South and among the mountain communities of Appalachia. Both these groups lived in a world increasingly integrated into America's state and economy, but in the late ninete~nth century took many of their values and actions from one
another rather than from the mass society. And part of those values
included the honor-driven but less stylized violence that was
always far more common in the South than in militaristic Prussia. I
believe honor was created anew in segregated Southern neighborhoods and in mountain hollows as well as in the Prussian
military and fraternities. By the end of the nineteenth century, the
planters and Junkers were among the least likely groups in their
societies to be engaged in personal violence.
In sum, the comparison of the Prussian and Southern experi-
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ence with honor and dueling suggests that we abandon some of the
snug teleological conceptions of economy, class, and culture that
so often distort comparative history. Neither the planters nor the
Junkers were simple preindustrial classes, but constantly negotiated among contradictory demands and aspirations, modem and
archaic; more than this, neither the New South nor post-1848
Prussia were mere holdovers from an older age, drifting through
history. As unfortunate as it may be, it seems that the violence of
honor was not merely the product of some discredited fragment
within otherwise progressive societies, but changed its form and
~ubstance with dismaying ease in societies deep in the change of
the nineteenth century. When we set comparative history into
motion, the enterprise becomes even more challenging and disconcerting-and maybe that is the way comparative history can
serve us best.

